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Immigration and the Legitimacy of the Scandinavian 
Welfare State: Some Preliminary Danish Findings 
 
Jørgen Goul Andersen2 
CCWS – Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies 
Dept. of Economics, Politics and Public Administration  
Aalborg University 
 
Immigration and the legitimacy of the welfare state 
It is frequently claimed that immigration may put the legitimacy of the welfare 
states under pressure (Soroka, Banting & Johnston 2003). The typical argument 
is that cultural homogeneity is a precondition of the solidarity that is the 
essence of the welfare state (Miller 1995: 90-99; Brochmann 2003). As the 
Scandinavian welfare states are based on residence/citizenship rather than 
contributions as the main criterion of social rights, they could appear 
particularly vulnerable (Forsander 2004).  
 
However, in addition to the argument about cultural homogeneity, one may 
also identify a number of other possible mechanisms that could link 
immigration to declining legitimacy (Swank & Betz 2003; Forsander 2004). In 
this paper, I discuss five factors that might connect immigration with declining 
support for the welfare state: 
 
• Multiculturalism: The solidarity of the welfare state depends on a shared 
national identity and culture. 
• Indirect effect: Demobilisation of the labour movement and mobilisation 
of anti-immigration parties. 
• Costs of immigration and competition over welfare: welfare state 
chauvinism. 
• Differences in work ethic between immigrants and the native 
population. 
• Institutional change and the emergence of an ethnic “underclass”. 
 
The assumption of an association (at the aggregate level) between influx of 
immigrants and the development of social expenditures has been confirmed in 
                                              
 
2 Keynote paper from 13th Nordic Migration Conference, Aalborg/AMID 18-20 November 
2004.  
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some of the few empirical studies that have been published until now (Alesina, 
Glaeser & Sacerdote 2001; Soroka, Banting & Johnston 2003; Alesina & 
Glaeser 2004). However, these findings are open to interpretations, and most of 
the literature on the subject remains rather speculative. In particular, there is a 
shortage of survey data which could illuminate the connecting links at the 
micro level.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate theoretically on the possible 
connecting links between immigration and support for the welfare state, and to 
illuminate such hypotheses by means of scattered Danish survey data. The 
approach is exploratory as few adequate operationalisations currently exist. 
Also, I shall avoid any lengthy discussion of the polysemous concept 
“legitimacy of the welfare state” (Goul Andersen 2005) but simply concentrate 
on some straightforward aspects as far as the dependent variable is concerned. 
 
The selection of Denmark as a test case is not completely arbitrary. More than 
most other countries, Denmark has experienced a thorough political 
mobilisation on the issue of immigration, which should strengthen both the 
direct and indirect effects of immigration on the support for the welfare state. 
In the following section, I briefly describe the impact of this mobilisation on 
the Danish context. The subsequent sections discuss the possible connection 
mechanisms one by one, and test some of them on the basis of Danish survey 
data. Finally, the concluding section also discusses how far the findings can be 
generalised and sketches some outlines for future research. 
 
Denmark: A “worst case”?  
In several respects, Denmark could be considered a “worst case” when 
analysing the impact of immigration on welfare state support. That is, if there is 
an effect, one could expect it to be particularly strong in Denmark. There are 
several reasons for this: First, as already mentioned, in the Scandinavian 
welfare model, social rights are based mainly on citizenship/residence rather 
than on contribution. To a (somewhat) larger degree, and more visibly than in 
other welfare states, this leaves the responsibility for social security with the 
taxpayers. Secondly, immigrants have not been very successful on the Danish 
labour market – and somewhat less so than in most other European welfare 
states, not to mention traditional immigration countries (Coleman & Wadensjö 
1999; Zimmermann & Hinte 2004: 116-19; Forsander 2004). Third, Denmark 
was traditionally one of the most ethnically homogeneous societies in the 
world, and occasionally, Danes have even been described as a tribe (Gundelach 
2001) – a theme which will be discussed below.  
 
Finally, and far most importantly, Denmark has experienced an unusually 
strong political mobilisation on the issue of immigration and ethnic conflict 
since the 1980s. When the Progress Party, launched in 1972 as a populist, 
anarcho-liberalist tax protest party, was heading towards extinction in the mid-
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1980s, the sudden explosion in the number of asylum-seekers in 1984 and 
onwards provided the party with a new rallying issue in the protest against 
immigration (Goul Andersen & Bjørklund 1990; Bjørklund & Goul Andersen 
2002). This reversed the decline in support: The party won 4.8 per cent in the 
1987 election and 9.0 per cent in the election of 1988 (table 1). After years of 
internal strife from which the party miraculously survived, the party’s former 
leader Pia Kjærsgaard in 1995 launched her Danish People’s Party, which soon 
became the successor of the Progress Party. Free from ideological heritage, the 
Danish People’s Party could specialise on immigration and replace former tax 
protests with a strong nationalism and an almost classic Social Democratic 
defence for the welfare state with priority to health care, elderly care and public 
pensions. The two anti-immigration parties gained 9.8 per cent in the 1998 
election and 12.6 per cent in 2001. In the 2005 election, the Danish People’s 
Party obtained 13.3 per cent of the votes. 
Table 1. Electoral support for the Progress Party and the 
Danish People's Party, 1973-2005. Percentages. 
 
 “Tax protest party” “Anti-immigration party” 
 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 
Danish 
People's 
Party 
          7.4 12.0 13.3 
Progress 
Party 15.9 13.6 14.6 11.0 8.9 3.6 4.8 9.0 6.4 6.4 2.4 0.6 - 
New 
right, 
total 
15.9 13.6 14.6 11.0 8.9 3.6 4.8 9.0 6.4 6.4 9.8 12.6 13.3 
Source: Statistics Denmark, Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
However, the political impact of anti-immigration parties in Denmark goes 
further. The Danish People’s Party recruited many working class Social 
Democrats. This party, in turn, became increasingly divided over this issue. Not 
surprisingly, voter problems and internal strife contributed to even more media 
attention to immigration. As from 1998, also the Liberal party saw the 
potentials in mobilising on this issue. Thus, even though increasing 
immigration is the underlying cause, the self-reinforcing dynamics of party 
competition contributes much to explaining why this issue is considered so 
much more important among Danish voters than among, say, Swedish voters. 
When 10 per cent of the Swedish voters mentioned immigration or refugees as 
an important cause of their party choice in 2002, this was a record-high figure. 
But in the Danish 2001 election, 51 per cent of the voters mentioned 
immigration as an important problem the politicians should handle (Goul 
Andersen 2003a; Holmberg & Oscarsson 2004: 123).3 
                                              
 
3 The questions are not perfectly commensurable as the Swedish question refers to motives for 
voting whereas the Danish question asks about a more important problem. However, this 
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Whereas saliency of immigration was strongly fluctuating in the 1980s 
(Tonsgaard 1989), it became a permanent issue on Danish voters’ agenda from 
1994 onwards (see table 2). In 2001, it was the most important single issue 
(although if all welfare issues are collapsed into one category, welfare ranks 
higher). After radical restrictions to immigration were adopted in 2002 by the 
Liberal-Conservative government and the Danish People’s Party, the saliency 
of immigration declined, but it has remained a core issue in Danish politics. 
 
Table 2. Percentages mentioning immigration among most 
important problems. 
 
1971-1984 (election surveys) 0 
Feb.1986 4 
Sep.1986 26 
Aug.1987 11 
Sep.1987 (election) 8 
May 1988 (election) 3 
May 1989 4 
June 1989 5 
Dec 1990 (election) 7 
Oct. 1994 (election) 17 
March 1998 (election) 35 
Feb.2000 (‘mid-term survey’) 38 
Feb.2001 32 
Nov.2001 (pre-election survey) 44 
Nov.2001 (election) 51 
Nov. 2003 (‘mid-term survey’) 21 
Jan. 2005 (pre-election survey) 24 
Question: Now I would like to ask which problems you think are the most important that the politicians 
should handle? (Slightly different wording in 1986-88).  
Sources: Togeby (1997:67), Tonsgaard (1989), Election surveys, and surveys conducted by Goul 
Andersen in cooperation with Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen. Election surveys refer to the month of the 
election even though many of the interviews were recorded 1-3 months later. 
 
But how should this high saliency be interpreted? Often, the mobilisation of 
negative attitudes against foreigners is seen as an effect of economic crisis and 
the accumulation of social problems. In such situations, immigrants may serve 
as an outlet for frustrations.  However, this does not appear to be the case in 
Denmark. On the contrary, the high saliency of immigration may be pictured 
partly as an effect of the solution of other problems. From the mid-1970s until 
the mid-1990s, unemployment was the big issue, alongside the economy (in 
particular the balance of payment). After 7 years of economic prosperity, these 
issues had declined into insignificance (table 3). Even environmental problems 
had been dealt with. What remained of “unresolved” problems were, first and 
foremost, welfare and immigration. 
                                                                                                                                 
 
explains only part of the deviance. The lion’s share is likely to reflect differences in saliency 
of the issue to Danish and Swedish voters. 
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Table 3. The political agenda of Danish voters, 1971-2005. 
Percentages of all answers.  
 
 1971 1975 1981 1984 1987 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 
1.Unemploym. 3 40 44 16 29 24 7 3 16 
2.Econ. probl. 24 32 28 
 } 63 
31 19 15 7 4 3 
3.Taxes 12 6 6 4 2 9 2 5 6 5 
Econ.issues, total 39 78 78 67 49 57 41 19 13 24 
4.Environment 8 1 2 3 15 10 8 9 4 4 
5.Welfare 26 4 8 13 15 20 38 47 51 53 
6.Immigration - - - - 4 4 8 14 20 13 
7.Foreign/defence  17 1 2 9 3 3 3 5 4 3 
8.Other 10 16 10 8 14 6 2 6 8 3 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Q. “Now I would like to ask which problems you consider most important today for politicians to take 
care of?”  
Table 3 shows distribution of all answers. Average number of answers was 2.4-2.5 in 1998-2001, a 
little below 2.0 answers in the 1970s and in 2005. 
Source: Election surveys. 2005: Pre-election survey conducted by Jørgen Goul Andersen in 
cooperation with Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen. 
 
Regardless of the background for this mobilisation, it remains a fact that the 
issue is strongly politicized, in a way that should provide for a thinking in 
terms of “us” and “them”, and consequently in terms of a division or even 
polarisation that may undermine solidarity. But apart from the mobilizing effect 
of party competition, what are the arguments for a more general tendency 
towards an erosion of solidarity because of immigration? 
 
The culture argument – the “simple version” 
As indicated above, the most widespread argument is the culture argument 
which relates welfare state solidarity to the existence of a homogeneous 
population with a shared national identity and culture. It could be argued that in 
Europe, the building of the welfare state was almost a part of the nation-
building process (Freeman 1986; Wolfe & Klausen 1997).  
As demonstrated by Alesina & Glaeser (2004: 140-48), there really is a strong 
correlation between racial and linguistic fractionalization and social welfare 
spending. Their explanation is related to the classic debates over American vs. 
European exceptionalism. Among the several causes of the absence of 
Socialism in the US, racial and ethnic divisions have always been listed among 
the most important – and whereas the United States have traditionally been 
described as the exception (Lipset 1996), Alesina & Glaeser rather turns the 
argument around: It is the cultural homogeneity of European welfare states that 
was exceptional. With increasing immigration, these nations may become more 
similar to the US, and consequently, one can also expect trends towards 
convergence of their welfare states. 
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In this section, I discuss this “simple” version of the hypothesis. It should be 
underlined, however, that Alesina & Glaeser do not suggest a deterministic and 
unconditional hypothesis about the impact of ethnic heterogeneity. In the first 
place, they emphasize that the impact depends on whether ethnic divisions 
coincide with economic divisions so that one ethnic group benefits 
disproportionately from welfare. (Alesina & Glaeser 2004: 134-36; 175-81).  
Secondly, they underline that ethnic divisions gain importance, first and 
foremost, when they are exploited by right-ring politicians for anti-welfare 
purposes: “In fact, the extreme right in Europe is already using the race card to 
oppose welfare policies. We predict that as racial heterogeneity in Europe 
increases, even the more ‘respectable’ right will move in that direction” 
(Alesina & Glaeser 2004: 219). Finally, Alesina & Glaeser (2004: 219) point 
out that differences in political institutions are also very important and act to 
preserve considerable differences in the welfare states across the Atlantic.  
 
I suggest, however, that also the institutions of the welfare state will have a 
major impact. It makes a fundamental difference what comes first: Ethnic 
heterogeneity or institutionalised welfare. I suggest that the institutional 
welfare state may serve to maintain solidarity with the poor, even if they are 
foreigners, and that right-wing parties will find it difficult to get support if they 
maintain an anti-welfare stance. 
 
From the literature on welfare state attitudes, the argument about cultural 
homogeneity could build some plausibility already on the observation that 
people tend to be most supportive of transfers and services which are given to 
people resembling themselves. Although it is not a rule without exception (for 
instance, universal child benefits are not too popular in Denmark), universal 
benefits have typically been more popular than selective ones. Also, people are 
usually more suspicious of abuse among social assistance claimants than 
among those who receive unemployment benefits, and there are usually more 
people who want to cut back on social assistance than on unemployment 
benefits – although in Denmark since the early 1980s, few people have wanted 
to cut back on any of these (Goul Andersen 2005). 
 
I also know from studies of “deservingness” that immigrants are nearly always 
considered less deserving than the indigenous population (van Oorschot 2005). 
And we know from numerous studies that nearly any sort of social and 
economic inequality between Danes and foreigners is strong and increasing. 
 
Still, the simple version of the cultural homogeneity argument is not as 
plausible as it might seem. In the first place, timing matters. Once built, 
institutions are resistant to change. Institutions have a strong impact on 
perceptions, norms, and values. Thus it would seem likely that reactions to 
immigration may be different in different welfare states. 
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Next, the culture argument often implies that solidarity is mechanical, to use 
Durkheim’s classic label. However, Durkheim’s argument was exactly that 
with modernity follows a transition from mechanical to organic solidarity, from 
a solidarity based on conformity to a solidarity based on difference and mutual 
interdependence. Indeed, one could argue that if solidarity was mechanical we 
should have observed a decline in support for the welfare state already in the 
1960s, long before the wave of immigration. In Europe, the last 40 years have 
witnessed a long process of diversification and break with tradition. Consider 
the 1960s and 1970s with its sudden outbreak of the youth rebellion, the 
student rebellion, new social movements etc. Consider the sudden and dramatic 
break with established sexual, religious or political values and norms in the late 
1960s; women’s liberation in the 1970s, the public acceptance of homosexual 
marriage in the 1980s and 1990s, etc. These cultural changes of course 
generated tension. But in Europe, they were absorbed. The outcome was a new 
stage of reflexive modernity with a large tolerance for diversity and to a large 
extent an outright rejection of tradition, including religion. To paraphrase 
Giddens (1991), any tradition unwilling to discuss its own assumptions was no 
longer a tradition but rather became isolated as fundamentalism. 
 
In Europe, there was no enduring counter-reaction to this transition to reflexive 
modernity. In the United States, there was more of a moralist and 
fundamentalist counter-reaction. George Bush was re-elected in November 
2004, in part because of his position on moral issues. In Europe at the same 
time, a newly appointed member of the European Commission was rejected by 
the European Parliament because of his traditionalist view on religion and the 
family.  
 
It may be argued that the tension between traditionalism and reflexivity is also 
in part what the tension between immigrant cultures and national culture is 
about. Partly as a politically framed stereotype, partly as a “real” phenomenon: 
Tradition vs. modernity – traditional gender roles versus women’s liberation; 
freedom of young people vs. paternal authority; fundamentalist religion vs. 
atheism or extremely individualised, “private” religion; sexual freedom vs. 
restrictive sexual norms, rigid norms vs. reflexivity, etc. This is why some 
progressives are cross-pressured between anti-traditionalism on the one hand 
and tolerance for cultural diversity on the other: which value should prevail 
when it comes to cultural traditionalism among ethnic minorities? But this is 
also a reminder that the current cultural clash between ethnic cultures bears 
quite some resemblance to the cultural clash between generations some 30-40 
years ago. 
 
But what does empirical evidence tell us? Beginning with the macro level, 
Taylor-Gooby (2005) has challenged the findings of Alesina & Glaeser (2004) 
by replicating their key analyses with political variables. It turns out that the 
explanatory power of racial/ethnic diversity drops into insignificance when 
controlling for political factors (percentage of left parties in cabinet). This 
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finding indicates that politics is an intervening variable between ethnic/racial 
diversity and welfare spending – it does not happen mechanically. However, 
this is to some extent argued by Alesina & Glaeser themselves. 
 
Table 4. Attitudes towards welfare spending, 1979-2005. 
Percentages and balance of opinion (percentage points).  
 
 2001: The state spends Balance of opinion: too little minus too much 
 too 
little 
appro-
priate 
Too 
much 
 
1985 
 
1990 
 
1994 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
2005 
Health care 70 27 3 +61 +61 +73 +77 +67 +49 +55 
Old age pension 47 52 1 +64 +57 +51 +42 +46 +38 +41 
Education 48 50 2 +44 +45 +42 +39 +46 +46 +65 
Unempl.benefits (level) 12 75 13 +17 +2 0 -7 -1   
Soc assistance (level) 11 65 24 +30 -11 -11 -19 -13   
Aid to developing countries 10 48 42 . -26 -35 -40 -32 -12 +5 
Immigrants/ refugees 12 43 45 . -30 -35 -41 -33 -13 -1 
Wording: “Now, I’ll ask about your view on public expenditures for various purposes. I should like to 
know whether you think, government spends 1) too much, 2) appropriate, or 3) too little money on 
these tasks.” Source: Election surveys (1985-2001); 2003 and 2005: Mid-term survey/pre-election 
survey, conducted in cooperation with Mandag Morgen. 
 
Turning to micro-level evidence from Denmark, table 4 reveals that economic 
support for refugees and immigrants has indeed been among the least popular 
public spending areas. However, it also turns out that this negative sentiment is 
not unconditional. After the 2002 reform which tightened the conditions for 
getting permissions to stay in the country, as well as the social assistance 
payments for immigrants for their first seven years in the country, public 
attitudes became considerably more “soft”. As late as in 2001, 45 per cent 
wanted to cut spending for immigrants and refugees; only 12 per cent found 
current spending insufficient. By 2005, only 25 per cent wanted to cut back, 
and 24 per cent wanted to increase spending. In other words, people’s attitudes 
seem to be much more determined by policy than by the target group. There 
was a widespread belief that immigration had gone too far, but there does not 
seem to be a widespread unwillingness to pay. 
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Table 5. Attitudes towards the scope of government, 2000. 
Percentages and average index values on a scale 1-4. 
 
To what extent should it be the responsibility 
of government to ... 
Defi-
nitely  
Pro-
bably  
Pro-
bably  
not  
Defi-
nitely 
not 
DK Index 
2000 
(1-4) 
Provide health care for the sick 83 14 2 1 0 1.19 
Provide a decent standard of living for the old 71 26 3 0 0 1.33 
Provide child care for everybody who need it 53 35 8 4 0 1.62 
Provide a decent standard of living for the 
unemployed 
33 48 16 2 1 1.88 
Provide decent housing for those who can’t 
afford it  
39 45 12 3 1 1.78 
Integrate immigrants  38 40 13 7 2 1.90 
Provide good leisure facilities for children and 
young people  
32 46 18 3 1 1.93 
Provide leave arrangements for families with 
small children  
30 46 15 8 1 2.00 
Provide leisure facilities for pensioners  28 46 19 6 1 2.03 
Provide a job for everyone who wants one 19 44 25 10 2 2.26 
Reduce income differences between the rich 
and the poor 
19 27 27 25 2 2.60 
Source: Welfare Values Survey conducted by the author (2000) (ISSP format questions); Nationwide 
representative survey. N=1235. 
 
This is also confirmed by another question where people were asked which 
tasks should be government responsibility (table 5). Not surprisingly, providing 
health care for the sick and decent standards of living for the old received top 
priority. And remarkably, even public childcare belongs to this category. But 
immediately following these items are three areas with a rather low ranking on 
the public expenditure question: Unemployment, housing and integration of 
immigrants. The latter is particularly noteworthy: Immigration is considered an 
important task for the state by a huge majority. Redistribution and full 
employment rank much lower at the list. Running the risk of over-
interpretation, one may suggest that this structure of attitudes reflects an 
underlying concern for citizenship. 
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Table 6. Association between considering immigration a 
salient problem and attitudes to immigration, 1998-2005. 
Percentages.  
 
 
 
 
 
“Immigration constitutes a serious 
threat to our national character” 
 
 
Year 
Immigration 
salient 
problem 
Agree Do not know Disagree 
Balance of opinion: 
Disagree minus agree 
yes 53 14 33 -20 
no 34 15 51 17 1998 
effect 1998    37 
yes 46 13 41 -5 
no 34 18 48 14 2001 
effect 2001    19 
yes 37 11 52 15 
no 45 3 52 7 2003 
effect 2003    8 
yes 42 4 54 12 
no 40 9 51 11 2005 
effect 2005    -1 
Source: 1998-2001. Election survey. 2003: Mid-term survey. 2005: Pre-election survey. 
 
However, the most important indication of solidarity is found when we analyse 
the association between saliency and attitudes (table 6). When the Progress 
Party and the Danish People’s Party mobilised to put the issue of immigration 
on the political agenda in the first half of the 1990s, there was a very strong 
association between seeing this issue as important and having negative attitudes 
towards immigrants. Even in 1998, this association was quite strong. But since 
then, it has changed almost year by year. By 2003, there was no longer an 
overweight of negative feelings among those who regarded immigration 
important. And by 2005, there was no longer any association between 
importance and attitudes. In other words, there has been a mobilization of 
people sympathetic to immigrants who think that this issue is important. No 
doubt, because they feel solidarity with immigrants, and/or because they see the 
dangers of new divisions and threats to cohesion in society. Whereas the 
mobilisation of negative feelings by the Danish People’s Party has been highly 
visible, this mobilisation of concern and solidarity may rather be characterised 
as a sort of silent revolution. In short, there is little reason that cultural diversity 
as such should undermine solidarity. 
 
Finally, from the culture hypothesis, one could imagine that in the most 
generous welfare states, people would be more reluctant to grant equal rights to 
immigrants, or that requirements to immigrants about cultural conformity 
would be higher: The more people pay, the more they should expect recipients 
to be like themselves. But this is not the case. From table 7, it seems that if 
there is any association, it rather pulls in the opposite direction. But no 
systematic pattern can be inferred. Scandinavians are among those who are 
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most inclined to think that immigrants should be treated equally; and they are 
about or below average for Western Europeans when it comes to requirements 
of assimilation. 
Table 7. Attitudes towards equal treatment and assimilation 
requirements. 2002. 
 
 Should immigrants be 
treated equally 
1= fully agree 
5=fully disagree 
Better for a country if 
almost everyone 
share customs & 
traditions 
1= fully disagree 
5=fully agree 
Important (0-10) that 
immigrants are committed to 
way of life in society 
Sweden 1.97 2.07 7.77 
Norway 2.10 2.21 6.64 
Denmark 2.14 2.17 6.84 
Finland 2.18 2.41 8.16 
Average 
Scandinavia 
2.10 2.22 7.35 
Netherlands 2.01 2.13 7.88 
Germany 2.57 2.11 7.86 
UK 2.44 2.15 7.37 
Italy 2.22 2.38 7.25 
mean all countries 2.36 2.39 7.54 
Source: European Social Survey  (2002). 
 
Divisions within the working class or the reappearance of the 
“Irish worker” problem? 
As pointed out by Alesina & Glaeser (2004), immigration may also have 
indirect effects on the welfare state and on welfare state legitimacy, mediated 
through a weakening of the labour movement. At least historically, Walter 
Korpi’s “power resources theory” which attributes the welfare state to the 
strength of the political labour movement, may account for some of the most 
important variations in the welfare state. As Taylor-Gooby (2005) has shown 
on the basis of Alesina & Glaeser’s data, the explanatory power of ethnic 
diversity is mediated primarily through the strength of socialist parties. As 
Alesina & Glaeser suggest, ethnic diversity was a main obstacle to socialism in 
the US, and by the same token, it may lead to a weakening of socialism in 
Europe. Indeed, ethnic divisions within the working class are a classic theme in 
the political theory of the labour movement, dating back to Marx. 
 
However, a classic source of weakening of the working class is ethnic divisions 
within that class. Marx was well aware of its importance, not only in the US, 
but also in Britain where the conflict between Irish and English workers was an 
impediment to their organization: 
 
Every industrial and commercial center in England now possesses a working 
class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish 
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proletarians.  The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a 
competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he 
regards himself as a member of the ruling nation and consequently he becomes 
a tool of the English aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, thus 
strengthening their domination over himself.  He cherishes religious, social, 
and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is 
much the same as that of the "poor whites" to the Negroes in the former slave 
states of the U.S.A.  The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own 
money. He sees in the English worker both the accomplice and the stupid tool 
of the English rulers in Ireland.  This antagonism is artificially kept alive and 
intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short, by all the means 
at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the 
impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret 
by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And the latter is quite aware 
of this. (translated from MEW, Bd. 32, pp. 668-669). 
 
In contemporary Europe, immigration seems to lead to widespread mobilisation 
of new anti-immigration right-wing movements with strong working class 
appeals. Applying the same explanatory model as Marx, Alesina & Glaeser 
suggests that  
 
racial conflicts can be used strategically by political entrepreneurs interested 
(...) in preventing redistribution. By convincing even the not so rich whites that 
redistribution favours minorities, they have been able to build large coalitions 
against welfare policies (...) In fact, the extreme right in Europe is already 
using the race card to oppose welfare policies. We predict that as racial 
heterogeneity in Europe increases, even the more “respectable” right will move 
in this direction (Alesina & Glaeser 2004: 218-19). 
 
Denmark appears to be an ideal-typical case of this development. As 
mentioned, right-wing parties began to mobilize on this issue already in the 
mid-1980s, and from the second half of the 1990s, also the Liberal Party began 
campaigning on this issue, most conspicuously in the 2001 election campaign 
with pictures of angry immigrants outside a courtroom protesting against their 
friends and relatives being sentenced for rape, accompanied by the slogan 
(borrowed from Blair): “Time for change” (Goul Andersen & Borre 2003).  
 
Looking at political attitudes of social classes, it is very obvious that there was 
a potential for mobilisation in the 1990s when the Social Democrats formed 
government with centre parties, in particular the Radical Liberals, who were 
strongly in favour of liberal, humanistic immigration policies. 
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Table 8. Attitudes to welfare, equality and immigration, 
1979/1990 - 2001. Balances of opinion: Left attitude minus 
right attitude. Percentage points.  
 
 Maintain social reforms  
at least as now 
Increase economic equality Immigration a threat 
 1979 1994 2001 1979 1994 2001 1990 1994 2001 
Manual workers +35 +53 +34 +42 +28 +27 -21 -17 -16 
White collar +33 +44 +25 +17 +4 0 +23 +29 +34 
Difference 1 11 9 25 24 27 44 46 50 
Source: Election surveys (N about 2000). 
 
Indeed, it has worked: Although class voting of the working class had declined 
already in the 1970s and 1980s, socialist parties still managed to mobilise 71 
per cent of the workers in the 1990 election (table 9). But in 2001, socialist 
parties only gained support from 42 per cent of the manual workers – half as 
much as in 1966. Parties to the right, on the other hand, attracted only 14 per 
cent of the working class vote in 1996, but 52 per cent in 2001. Actually, the 
Liberal-Conservative government and its supporting party the Danish People’s 
Party received slightly more support from manual workers than from white 
collars. Preliminary results from the 2005 election indicate that this pattern was 
maintained or even aggravated. It can also be demonstrated that the ideological 
group that was lost by the socialists is the group which combines a positive 
attitude to equality (agreeing that “in politics, one should strive for the same 
economic conditions for everybody, regardless of education and occupation”) 
with a negative attitude to foreigners (agreeing that “immigration constitutes a 
serious threat to our national character”). Among those who combine these 
attitudes (which are uncorrelated!), support for Socialist parties declined from 
58 per cent in 1990 to 28 per cent in 2005 (and 27 per cent in June, 2005). 
Combined support for the Liberals, the Conservatives and the Danish People’s 
Party, by contrast, increased from 29 to 58 per cent (and 64 per cent in June, 
2005). 
 
Beneficiaries of the working class vote were both the Liberal Party and the 
Danish People’s Party. Beyond comparison, the Danish People’s Party has 
become Denmark’s most clean-cut working-class party. It attracted voters 
disproportionately from the working class already from 1979, but from 1988, it 
accelerated, and from 1994 onwards, the Danish People’s Party has had a more 
clear working class profile than the Social Democrats (table 10). 
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Table 9. Proportion voting socialist and on parties to the right, 
by occupation. Denmark 1966-2001. 2) Percentages. 
 
 Socialist parties Liberals, Conservatives, New Right 
 1966 1990 2001 1966 2001 
Manual workers 81 71 42 14 52 
White collars 42 48 39 42 49 
Self-employed 14 13 11 73 83 
All voters 50 50 38 40 53 
Source: Election Surveys. N > 10000 in 1966, > 3000 in 1990, > 4000 in 2001. 
 
Table 10. Proportion of workers among the supporters of 
various party groups. Deviations from sample means. 
Percentage points. 
 
 1966 1973 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 
Progress Party/DPP  -4 -1 +2 +6 +9 +4 +14 +15 +16 +13 +21 
Other bourg. part. -26 -15 -20 -17 -15 -12 -12 -15 -16 -11 -10 -8 
Social demcr. part. +27 +26 +20 +15 +18 +20 +19 +16 +16 +13 +9 +8 
Left Wing +26 +17 +6 +3 +4 0 +2 +4 +1 -3 -3 -9 
Normal        40 37 35 36 36 32 32 36 31 34 38 35 
Source: Bjrrklund & Andersen (2002). Election surveys, Danish Election Programme. Except 
for 1979 (N about 2000), 1988 and 1990 (N >3000), N is >4000).  
Note. Entries are deviations between the proportion of manual workers among the supporters 
of various party groups and in the entire sample (“normal”). Only voters belonging to the 
labour force (but 1966 including housewives classified according to their husband´s position). 
 
So far, the data more than confirms Alesina & Glaeser’s predictions. However, 
there is one problem with their theory: The assumption that the new right 
mobilise anti-welfare sentiments or manipulate people who are positive 
towards the welfare state to support another political programme. As can be 
seen from table 11, adherents of the Danish People’s Party are more supportive 
of the “classic” welfare arrangements more than any other party: Pensions, 
health care, elderly care and early retirement allowance (enabling people to 
retire voluntarily at the age of 60). True, adherents of the party also have more 
“fiscal illusions” than adherents of other parties, so when it comes to tax relief, 
they are more resembling centre-right voters. 
Immigration and the Legitimacy of the Scandinavian Welfare State 
 
 
15
Table 11. Attitudes to welfare expenditures in Denmark 2005, 
by party choice. Percentage Difference Index: Proportions 
wanting to spend more minus proportions wanting to spend 
less. Percentage Points. 
 
 
 
 
 
Party 
Public 
pensions 
Health 
care 
Home 
help 
Early 
retirement 
allowance 
Index 
(average) 
Immigrants 
and refugees (N) 
Left wing 36 64 60 0 40 63 37 
Social Dem. 52 56 79 18 51 10 117 
Centre Parties 19 46 55 -34 22 37 51 
Liberals + Cons.  38 46 71 -12 36 -13 193 
Danish People’s Party 67 66 79 36 62 -58 47 
Source: Pre-election survey conducted by the author in cooperation with Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen, 
January 2005. 
  
Also, if we look at aggregates (table 12), it is obvious that the increasing 
support for the right was not accompanied by declining support for welfare. On 
the contrary, in order to obtain this impressive support from working-class 
voters, the parties to the right had to pay a price: Namely to declare themselves 
to be explicitly supportive of the welfare state. In the 2005 election campaign, 
the government deliberately sought to eliminate any impression of difference in 
social programmes between the government and the Social Democrats, 
furthermore, declaring that no welfare reforms containing retrenchment would 
be carried through except in agreement with the Social Democrats; 
furthermore, they would not be implemented until after the next election. 
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Table 12. Welfare State Attitudes, 1994-2005. Percentages and 
PDI's (percentage difference indexes) in favour of the welfare 
state. 
 
  
Agree 
mostly 
with A 
Agree 
mostly 
with B 
Indif-
ferent/ 
Don't 
know 
Total 
PDI (in 
favour of 
welfare 
state) 
1994 28 63 9 100 35 
1998 30 63 7 100 33 
2000 25 69 6 100 44 
2001 34 58 8 100 24 
A: Social reforms have gone too far 
B: Social reforms maintained 
2005 20 74 7 100 54 
1994 47 44 9 100 -3 
1998 41 54 5 100 13 
2000 40 55 5 100 15 
2001 45 51 4 100 6 
2003 34 61 5 100 27 
A: Prefer tax relief  
B: Prefer improved welfare services 
 
 
2005 35 61 4 100 26 
 
*) Wordings: 
1. “First a question about government spending on social programs. 
A says: ‘Social reforms have gone too far. More than now, people should manage without social 
security and contributions from society’.  
B says: ‘The social reforms that have been carried through in this country, should be maintained at least 
at the present level’.  
- Do you agree mostly with A or with B?” 
2. “If it becomes possible in the long run to lower taxation, what would you prefer: ... 
A: Tax relief or B: Improved public services?” 
Source: 1994, 1998, 2001: Election surveys (N=2000); 2000: Welfare survey (N=1235); 2003: Mid-
term survey; 2005: Pre-election survey (N=560). The 2003 and 2005 surveys were conducted by the 
author in cooperation with Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen and AC Nielsen AIM A/S. 
 
 
Now, these data do not rule out the possibility that the parties to the right will 
pursue a long-term goal of rolling back the welfare state. Indeed, the Liberal 
Party (and not least the leading ideologue at that time, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, now prime minister) advocated a “minimal state” in the early 
1990s. Stated differently: Even though the government does not pursue 
“programmatic retrenchment”, it may still pursue “systemic retrenchment” 
(Pierson 1994). But any such “hidden goals” are clearly subordinated to the 
strategy of maintaining support from the working-class segment that keeps the 
government in power. And as far as the Danish People’s Party is concerned, 
this party is much more preoccupied with overtaking the position as the “true 
Social Democrats” from an increasingly confused Social Democratic party that 
has lost its working-class roots and its sense of direction. Indeed this party is 
increasingly in a position to beat the Social Democrats not only on the issue of 
immigration but also on the issue of welfare as leading Social Democrats have 
become attracted by more or less neoliberal ideas of welfare reforms. 
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If we look at workplace relations between Danes and immigrants, we do not 
have much hard evidence. But in general, there appear to be few, if any, 
tensions. Newer data (collected by Jens Peter Frølund Thomsen, not yet 
published) also seems to confirm the old contact hypothesis that contacts, and 
in particular workplace contacts, tend to reduce negative sentiments towards 
immigrants. 
 
Of course, a long-term weakening of the Social Democratic party is likely to 
have long-term implications for the Danish Welfare State, but at least in the 
short- and medium term, the right wing has not won any mandate to change the 
welfare state; it has won a mandate to pursue more harsh immigration policies 
(in particular limiting access to the country), but it has only won this mandate 
by issuing quite strong welfare guarantees. 
 
The costs of immigration 
Due to the low labour market participation among non-western immigrants in 
Denmark, immigration is quite costly – more than in most other welfare states. 
This also means that there could potentially be a competition for welfare which 
could manifest itself as “welfare chauvinism” among those who are dependent 
on welfare. 
 
However, in the Danish case, there is virtually nothing to confirm such 
assumptions. In the first place, there is no association whatsoever between 
labour market position or “welfare dependence” and attitudes towards 
immigrants, or between “welfare dependence” and support for right-wing 
populism (Goul Andersen 2002). 
 
Secondly, Danes (and Scandinavians) are among the least likely to fear 
competition on the labour market, or competition over welfare, according to the 
2002 European Social Survey (table 13). They are not inclined to fear a 
downward pressure on wages, they are among those least inclined to think that 
immigration harms the economic prospects of the poor, and they typically do 
not think that unemployed immigrants should be sent home. 
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Table 13. Competition on the labour market/competition over 
welfare. ESS survey, 2002. Average values on a scale from 1 
(strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). 
 
 Average wages 
brought down by 
immigr. 
Immigration harm 
econ. prospects of 
the poor 
Unemployed 
immigrants  
should be sent home 
Sweden 3.41 3.25 3.69 
Norway 3.56 3.11 3.03 
Denmark 3.47 3.15 3.43 
Finland 2.93 2.69 3.03 
Average 
Scandinavia 3.34 3.05 3.29 
Netherlands 3.36 2.96 2.87 
Germany 2.95 2.60 2.72 
UK 2.93 2.70 2.64 
Italy 3.08 2.92 2.61 
mean all countries 2.94 2.68 2.82 
Source: European Social Survey (ESS), 2002. 
 
However, there is a strong interest among political elites (and public policy 
elites) in increasing labour market participation among immigrants, and there is 
also widespread public acceptance of using pressure in order to bring 
immigrants to work. This is perhaps where we should look for sources of 
change. For instance, a “Welfare Commission” consisting of economists was 
appointed by the Danish government in 2003 in order to explore the challenges 
of ageing and to come up with proposals for reform. Some members of the 
Commission were also members of a “Social Commission” in the days of mass 
unemployment 1991-93. In accordance with later OECD (1994) 
recommendations, this commission proposed that minimum wages should be 
lowered in order to provide an opportunity for low-skilled workers to get a 
chance to get back to work. This proposal received absolutely no support in the 
general public, and as the long period of prosperity from 1994 reduced 
unemployment at least as much among the unskilled as among the skilled, 
without lowering minimum wages, this proposal was absolutely dead for many 
years. But by 2005, the Welfare Commission has revived the proposal, now 
framed as a measure to give low-skilled immigrants a chance of entering the 
labour market. With this framing, and with a weak labour movement, the 
proposal might have a future. 
 
This remains purely speculative so far, but one cannot rule out the possibility 
that some old neoliberal proposals which have had no popular support so far, 
could become much more legitimate if they were framed as efforts that should 
get immigrants back to work. Indeed, as part of an “integration programme” 
adopted in the spring 2005, measures were included to remove social assistance 
for housewives in households where both man and wife received social 
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assistance and had no labour market record. This measure was directed against 
immigrants who were allegedly quite satisfied with a position as a housewife 
and had no intention of participating actively on the labour market unless they 
were forced to do so. Remarkably, the Social Democrats were in fact exerting 
pressure to make the proposal tougher. What is remarkable about this is not the 
increasing emphasis on the duty to work (which has a long tradition in 
Denmark but has been strengthened more and more since the mid-1990s). The 
remarkable aspect is that a general social policy measure was included in a 
package about integration of foreigners. It is difficult to tell whether the 
proposal would receive popular support if it was framed differently (probably it 
would), but at least the framing increased the possibility to carry the proposal 
through without resistance. 
 
Work orientations  
This brings us to the last mediating path to be discussed in this paper. The 
Danish welfare state provides excellent protection against poverty and excellent 
protection for low-income people. Average compensation is not very high, but 
social minima are very high. For instance, the compensation rate of 
unemployment benefits is – in principle – 90 per cent. As the ceiling is very 
low, average compensation is much lower – comparable with other Northern 
European countries. But for low-income groups, with the least attractive job 
opportunities, compensation is high. Besides, duration is long: four years – and 
there are no seniority requirements: The four years applies to anybody who is 
eligible (although supplementary requirements about education have been 
introduced for younger people). 
 
The dark side is of course that economic incentives to work are small, and this 
has been the concern of many economic analyses (e.g. Ministry of Finance 
2002, 2004). However, it is equally well documented that this does not 
constitute any big problem as non-financial employment commitment is 
unusually strong in Scandinavia – and in Denmark it is the strongest in any 
country (Svallfors et al. 2001; Goul Andersen et al. 2003). Apart from a strong 
“protestant” work ethic, there are also many other non-economic incentives to 
work, including fulfilment of social needs, and indeed self-realisation. It is also 
well-documented that these incentives are particularly strong in Denmark, due 
to a rather “progressive” workplace culture (Goul Andersen et al. 2003; Goul 
Andersen 2003b). In short, the tacit cultural precondition of the Danish welfare 
state is a strong employment commitment and a strong instinct to provide for 
oneself. 
 
The question is of course whether this employment commitment is equally 
strong among immigrants. If not, it could undermine the cultural precondition 
of the welfare state and force the welfare state to rely more on economic 
incentives. By and large, we have only anecdotical evidence on “welfare 
dependency” including “clientilistic” or “demanding” forms of behaviour.  The 
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only data available so far are from a country-wide survey of long-term 
unemployed conducted in 1999, but it included only 62 respondents with a 
mother tongue that did not belong to the languages spoken in the EU area and 
Norway. Based on this sample, the results did not indicate any difference in 
work orientations, but admittedly, better data are required to test this.4 
 
Table 14. Work orientations, by mother tongue. 
 
 Danish/ language 
spoken in EU Others 
Want a job 81 % 85 % 
Looked actively for a job 71 % 73 % 
Willing to move for a job 25 % 37 % 
Willing to take job in another industry 20 % 36 % 
 
Conclusions 
Immigration certainly constitutes a challenge to European Welfare States in 
many respects. Labour market marginalisation among immigrants is 
widespread, and there is obviously a risk that an underclass of immigrants 
could emerge. It is also plausible that the European welfare states are built on 
the basis of cultural homogeneity and a shared national identity, and that 
racial/ethnic diversity is one of the key factors that explain the differences 
between the welfare state in Europe and the US.  
 
However, it does not follow, that multiculturalism will undermine the European 
welfare states. There is the crucial question of temporal order. Inserting 
multiculturalism into an institutionalised welfare state has different 
consequences than institutionalising welfare in a multicultural society. Testing 
the “simple” culture hypothesis on Denmark – presumably a “worst case” in 
terms of political mobilisation of anti-immigration sentiments granting a 
majority to the right (for the first time since 1920) – did not provide any 
confirmation of the hypothesis. Attitudes towards supporting immigrants were 
rather negative, but they were also very policy-sensitive. After the tightening of 
access to the country, attitudes have softened considerably as far as the 
economic aspects are concerned. Securing integration of immigrants is 
considered among the most important tasks of government. And the increasing 
saliency of immigration among voters reflects more and more solidarity 
                                              
 
4 Even among 24 married respondents receiving social assistance (=no short-term incentives 
to work), 62 per cent have looked actively for a job within the last month – at least as much as 
among all Danes. 
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concerns. By 2005, those who are concerned about immigration even hold 
slightly more positive attitudes than those who are not concerned. 
 
Moving to the question of the impact of immigration on the labour movement, 
it is true that in the Danish case, this issue has contributed to something 
resembling a collapse of working-class support for Socialist parties. Working- 
class support has been captured by the parties to the right who have deliberately 
competed with the Social Democrats over this segment of voters. And the 
Social Democratic Party has been confused about strategies (apparently to a 
large degree because it has lacked an adequate understanding of the situation – 
unlike the Liberal Party and the Danish People’s Party). However, even though 
these parties (or their predecessors) used to be very critical of the welfare state, 
they have not managed to mobilise anti-welfare attitudes, nor have they sought 
to do so. They have recognised that there was a price to be paid for remaining 
in office, and to the disappointment of Liberal ideologues, the Liberal party has 
indirectly contributed to mobilise pro-welfare sentiments. The party has largely 
abstained from programmatic retrenchment but has exploited some 
opportunities to make systemic retrenchment that may perhaps have long-term 
effects. Still, it has basically accepted that there was a price to be paid for 
maintaining working-class support. 
 
For the Danish People’s Party, the situation is somewhat different. Its long-
term strategy is not to remain a protest party, and hardly even a right-wing 
party. Another possibility is much more appealing, namely to become a 
guardian of social democratic welfare ideals and perhaps even the successor of 
the “old” Social Democratic Party. This strategy is flexible, and it is of course 
dictated by the Danish context. But it is no accident that the party has been so 
successful and has been able to maintain a quite stable support. This could 
indicate that a similar strategy is open to sister parties in other countries (if they 
act in a self-interested manner). At any rate, the assumption that these parties 
will use anti-immigration sentiments as a vehicle for anti-welfare policies is 
presumably wrong, not only in the Danish case, but more generally. Finally, it 
is worth noticing that the mobilisation of the right in Denmark has been 
accompanied by mobilisation of pro-welfare sentiments – and that Danes are 
not by any comparative standards inclined to regard immigrants as competitors 
for job or for welfare. Basically, it is not a mobilisation of hatred but rather a 
mobilisation of worries (and indeed prejudices) – one could say in Ulrich 
Bech’s terms that immigration is the new risk of the right wing in “risk society” 
just like the environment and other issues are the risks of the left. 
 
This concern about risks also includes a concern about the economic costs of 
immigration. Given the prosperous Danish economy, however, this is currently 
more a matter of elite concern than a matter of mass concern. At the same time, 
immigration provides opportunities for a new framing of old social policy goals 
among policy elites – inside and outside government. This is perhaps where we 
should look for potentials for institutional change. Another issue (which is 
AMID Working Paper Series 
 
 
22
more narrowly related to the Danish or Scandinavian welfare state) is the 
question whether immigrants share the strong employment commitment that is 
a tacit foundation of the Danish welfare state, or whether there are potentials 
for a “dependency culture” among immigrants. No doubt, this would rather be 
an effect of poverty than a cause of poverty (as American neo-liberals or neo-
conservatives would have it). But alongside other tendencies towards 
accumulation of multidimensional deprivation among immigrants, this is of 
course an instance where there are quite some potential for change. 
 
However, I will suggest that as long as the welfare state maintains its universal 
character – “from all of us to all of us” – there are no real dangers that cultural 
diversity will constitute a serious threat to welfare state legitimacy in the 
advanced European welfare states. If welfare is a matter of payment from “us” 
to “those people” (as the first American president Bush phrased it), this will 
inevitably raise a number of critical questions about the deservingness of “those 
people” – are they like “us”, do “we” have any obligation towards “them”, 
could “they” do more by themselves, etc.? Undoubtedly, such questions will 
tend to be more critical, the more culturally deviant this group of welfare 
recipients are. But in an institutional welfare state where there is no real 
distinction between “them” and “us”, this is supposedly much less important. 
This also means that where we should be really observant is about the 
institutions of the welfare state. There have been strong forces advocating a 
more residual or targeted welfare state, sometimes even based on the argument 
that it would enable society to do much more for those “really in need”. Since 
Titmuss, the most widely shared belief among welfare researchers is that this is 
by no means the case – that “welfare for the poor” inevitably ends up as “poor 
welfare”. This may be aggravated by cultural diversity but as long as the 
welfare state avoids this slide (which it might indeed enter for many other 
reasons than immigration), it seems more likely that the welfare state will make 
it possible to mobilise solidarity with immigrants, than the presence of 
immigrants will undermine the welfare state. 
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